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Abstract. Microprocessor pipelining is a well-established technique that
improves performance and reduces power consumption by overlapping in-
struction execution. Verifying, however, that an implementation meets
this ISA speciﬁcation is complex and time-consuming. One of the key
veriﬁcation issues that must be addressed is that of overlapping instruc-
tion execution. This can introduce hazards where, for instance, a new
instruction reads the value from a register which will be written by an
earlier instruction that has not yet completed. Using Event-B’s support
for reﬁnement with automated proof, a method is explored where the ab-
stract machine represents directly an instruction from the ISA that spec-
iﬁes the e ect that the instruction has on the microprocessor register ﬁle.
Reﬁnement is then used systematically to derive a concrete, pipelined ex-
ecution of that instruction. Microarchitectural considerations are raised
to the speciﬁcation level and design choices can be veriﬁed much earlier
in the ﬂow. The method proposed therefore has the potential to be in-
tegrated into an existing high-level synthesis methodology, providing an
automated design and veriﬁcation ﬂow from high-level speciﬁcation to
hardware.
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1 Introduction
Microprocessor pipelining is a well-established technique that improves perfor-
mance and reduces power consumption by overlapping instruction execution.
Modern System-on-Chip microprocessors used for mobile applications have very
stringent power consumption requirements and are typically based on the 5-stage
DLX microprocessor [1]. From the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) speciﬁca-
tion, a pipelined microarchitecture is developed that implements the speciﬁca-
tion. Verifying, however, that an implementation meets this ISA speciﬁcation is2 J. Colley, M. Butler
complex and time-consuming. Current veriﬁcation techniques are predominantly
test based within a Register Transfer Level (RTL) simulation and synthesis ﬂow.
One of the key veriﬁcation issues that must be addressed is that of overlap-
ping instruction execution. This can introduce hazards where, for instance, a
new instruction reads the value from a register which will be written by an ear-
lier instruction that has not yet completed. These are termed Read-After-Write
(RAW) data hazards [1]. The presence of hazards depends on the instruction mix
presented to the microprocessor and pseudo-random test generation techniques
have been used in an attempt to achieve adequate test coverage of instruction
combinations [2], [3] .
Formal techniques, using both model checking and theorem proving, have
been used in microprocessor veriﬁcation, but as an adjunct to the simulation-
based ﬂow. These techniques are applied after the design is completed in the hope
of detecting errors not discovered by testing. Higher-level hardware description
languages such as Bluespec [4] and CAL [5], which provide an automatic syn-
thesis route to RTL, can speed up the design process, but it is the veriﬁcation
costs that dominate in the overall ﬂow and the bulk of the veriﬁcation must still
be done at the Register Transfer Level.
Event-B [6], [7] is a proof-based modelling language and method that en-
ables the development of speciﬁcations using reﬁnement. The Rodin platform
[8] is the Eclipse-based IDE that provides support for Event-B reﬁnement and
mathematical proof. Using Event-B’s support for reﬁnement with automated
proof, a method is explored where the abstract machine represents directly an
instruction from the ISA that speciﬁes the e ect that the instruction has on the
microprocessor register ﬁle. Reﬁnement is then used systematically to derive a
concrete, pipelined execution of that instruction. At each reﬁnement step the im-
portance is shown of addressing the inherent simultaneity that characterises the
pipelined behaviour and, in particular, the e ects that feedback has in pipeline
construction.
To illustrate the method, the register/register arithmetic instruction of a typ-
ical System-on-Chip (SoC) microprocessor is chosen that can exhibit RAW data
hazards with overlapping execution. The technique, termed forwarding, where
intermediate values are fed back to a stage that needs them, is employed in mod-
ern microprocessors to provide a very e cient means of managing RAW hazards
[1]. Debugging the forwarding logic has, however, been found to be di cult and
expensive [9] . With the introduction of appropriate invariants in our approach,
it is shown that the concrete, pipelined reﬁnement will not preserve these invari-
ants unless the RAW hazards are detected and managed appropriately.
The concrete Event-B model implements forwarding in a way that corre-
sponds directly to the techniques used in microprocessor design and is proved,
automatically, in the Rodin environment to be a correct reﬁnement of the ab-
stract ISA speciﬁcation. Thus, microarchitectural considerations are raised to
the speciﬁcation level and design choices can be veriﬁed much earlier in the ﬂow.
The concrete model also has a direct correspondence to an equivalent hardware
description in the high-level languages Bluespec and CAL, which like Event-BEvent-B Pipelined Processor Proof 3
are based on guarded atomic actions. The method proposed therefore has the
potential to be integrated into an existing high-level synthesis methodology, pro-
viding an automated design and veriﬁcation ﬂow from high-level speciﬁcation to
hardware.
2 An Overview of Event-B
In Event-B, an abstract model comprises a machine that speciﬁes the high-
level behaviour and a context, made up of sets, constants and their properties,
that represents the type environment for the high-level machine. The machine
is represented as a set of state variables, v and a set of events, guarded atomic
actions, which modify the state. If more than one action is enabled, then one
is chosen non-deterministically for execution, an observable transition on the
state variables which must preserve an invariant on the variables, I(v). A more
concrete representation of the machine may then be created which reﬁnes the
abstract machine, and the abstract context may be extended to support the
types required by the reﬁnement. Gluing invariants are used to verify that the
concrete machine is a correct reﬁnement of the abstract. Gluing invariants give
rise to proof obligations for pairs of abstract and corresponding concrete events.
Events may also have parameters which take, non-deterministically, the values
that will make the guards in which they are referenced true.
An event can be represented by the generalized substitution,
any x where P(x,v) then v := F(x,v) end
where x represents the event parameters and v represents the value of the ma-
chine state variables. Informally, this event can be ﬁred provided that the guard
P(x, v) can be satisﬁed for some value x. The details are explained in [10] .
3 Modelling the Arithmetic Instruction
3.1 The Abstract ISA Model
The structure of a register/register arithmetic instruction associates the opcode
with a destination register Rr and two source registers Ra and Rb. The Event-B
context, PIPEC, for the arithmetic instruction therefore deﬁnes a set of oper-
ations Op, the type Register, the subset of operations that are of type regis-
ter/register arithmetic, ArithRRop, and the relationship between the ﬁelds of
the arithmetic instruction and their associated registers. The conventions of [11]
are followed to model operation ﬁelds. The context also deﬁnes No Operation,
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CONTEXT PIPEC
SETS
Op
CONSTANTS
Register
Rr
Ra
Rb
NOP
ArithRROp
AXIOMS
axm1 : Register   N
axm2 : Rr   Op   Register
axm3 : Ra   Op   Register
axm4 : Rb   Op   Register
axm5 : ArithRROp   Op
axm6 : NOP   Op
axm7 : NOP /   ArithRROp
END
The abstract machine, PIPEM, deﬁnes the register ﬁle Regs and a single
event ArithRR that speciﬁes the e ect that execution of the instruction has on
the register ﬁle. For simplicity, the addition operation is shown, but this can
more generally be represented by an uninterpreted function [12] without a ect-
ing the proof approach used. The parameter pop speciﬁes the environment for
the event; given an instruction of type ArithRROp, the state of the register ﬁle
will be updated according to that instruction.
MACHINE PIPEM
SEES PIPEC
VARIABLES
Regs
INVARIANTS
inv1 : Regs   Register   Z
EVENTS
Initialisation
begin
act1 : Regs := Register   {0}
end
Event ArithRR   =
any
pop
where
grd1 : pop   ArithRROp
then
act1 : Regs(Rr(pop)) := Regs(Ra(pop)) + Regs(Rb(pop))
end
END
The microarchitecture of the abstract machine is shown in Figure 1.Event-B Pipelined Processor Proof 5
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Fig.1. Abstract Machine: Microarchitecture
3.2 The First Reﬁnement: a 2-stage pipeline
A 2-stage pipeline is now introduced which reﬁnes the abstract machine. The
second pipeline stage is a concrete representation of the Write Back (WB) stage
while the ﬁrst stage is still abstract, representing the Fetch/Decode/Execute op-
erations of the pipeline.
MACHINE PIPER1
REFINES PIPEM
SEES PIPEC
VARIABLES
Regs
EXop
ALUout
INVARIANTS
inv1 : EXop   Op
inv2 : ALUout   Z
inv3 : ALUout = Regs(Ra(EXop)) + Regs(Rb(EXop))
EVENTS
Event FDEXWB   =
reﬁnes ArithRR
any
ppop
where
grd1 : EXop   ArithRROp
grd2 : ppop   ArithRROp
grd3 : Rr(EXop)  = Ra(ppop)6 J. Colley, M. Butler
grd4 : Rr(EXop)  = Rb(ppop)
with
pop : pop = EXop
then
act1 : Regs(Rr(EXop)) := ALUout
act2 : ALUout := Regs(Ra(ppop)) + Regs(Rb(ppop))
act3 : EXop := ppop
end
END
Two new variables, ALUout and EXop are introduced to represent the EXWB
pipeline registers. The parameter pop of the abstract ArithRR event is bound
to the concrete register EXop using an Event-B witness and a new parameter
ppop represents the environment of the reﬁned event, FDEXWB. The FDEXWB
event models the simultaneous execution of both pipeline stages. The microar-
chitecture of the reﬁned machine is shown in Figure 2.
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Fig.2. Reﬁned Machine: Microarchitecture
It is now necessary to introduce the gluing invariant to establish that this
is a correct reﬁnement of the abstract machine. To preserve the meaning of the
abstract speciﬁcation, the new variable ALUout must always have the value
Regs(Ra(EXop)) + Regs(Rb(EXop)), as represented by the invariant inv3. The
Rodin prover, however, shows that this invariant is not preserved by the reﬁned
machine. The abstract FDEX pipeline stage simultaneously reads the register
ﬁle while the WB stage is writing to it. If the location being read is the same as
that being written, a Read After Write (RAW) data hazard will be encountered
and the wrong value will read by the ﬁrst pipeline stage. This inherent feedback
in the pipelined implementation must be addressed explicitly if it is to meet its
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3.3 Detecting the RAW Hazard
The abstract FDEX pipeline stage may only read from the source registers
Ra and Rb if they do not coincide with the target register Rr of the previous
instruction, represented by Rr(EXop)). Two new guards are introduced into the
reﬁned event to meet this requirement.
grd1 : ...
grd2 : ...
grd3 : Rr(EXop)  = Ra(ppop)
grd4 : Rr(EXop)  = Rb(ppop)
The Rodin prover now shows that the invariant ALUout = Regs(Ra(EXop)) +
Regs(Rb(EXop)) is preserved by the reﬁned machine.
3.4 Dealing Correctly with the RAW Hazard
It is now necessary to deal with the cases where a hazard is encountered on
register Ra alone, on register Rb alone and on both registers Ra and Rb. In
each case, the required value(s) can be read from the ALUout register. This
corresponds directly to the forwarding technique used in microprocessor design.
Three extra events are introduced to deal with each case. For instance, for the
hazard on register Ra, the guards of the event are
grd3 : Rr(EXop) = Ra(ppop)
grd4 : Rr(EXop)  = Rb(ppop)
and the associated action now reads the value of Ra from ALUout.
act2 : ALUout := ALUout + Regs(Rb(ppop))
The Rodin prover shows that, for each case, the invariant is preserved. The
microarchitecture of the modiﬁed reﬁned machine is shown in Figure 3.
3.5 Further Reﬁnements
The reﬁnement process can continue, systematically, until all the pipeline stages
are represented in concrete form. At each step, the gluing invariants will ensure
that the reﬁnement implements its predecessor.
In the second reﬁnement, the concrete Execute (EX) stage is introduced
together with the IDEX pipeline registers. The registers A and B store the values
of Ra and Rb respectively. Four events in the abstract Fetch/Decode stage are
needed to deal with the possible data hazard combinations and two new gluing
invariants,
inv1 : A = Regs(Ra(IDop))
inv2 : B = Regs(Rb(IDop))8 J. Colley, M. Butler
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Fig.3. Reﬁned Machine with forwarding: Microarchitecture
ensure that the data hazards are dealt with correctly. When combined with the
four EXWB events, this gives a total of sixteen events.
In the third reﬁnement, the concrete Instruction Fetch IF and Instruction
Decode ID are established.
To generalise this approach for uninterpreted arithmetic operations, the ac-
tion
act1 : Regs(Rr(p)) := Regs(Ra(p)) + Regs(Rb(p))
can be replaced with
act1 : Regs(Rr(p)) := fop(Regs(Ra(p))    Regs(Rb(p)))
where
grd1 : fop = func(p)
and
axm8 : func   Op   Register
is a ﬁeld of the arithmetic instruction. The proofs with arbitrary arithmetic
operations are still automatic.
The ﬁnal, concrete pipeline is represented by sixteen events and all the proof
obligations generated are discharged automatically by the Rodin tool, as shown
in Table 1.
4 Related Work
Early work in the formal veriﬁcation of microprocessors was focused on simple,
non-pipelined processors described at the Register Transfer Level (RTL). In [13]Event-B Pipelined Processor Proof 9
Total no. of Discharged
proof obligations Automatically
Abstract Model 3 3
1st Reﬁnement 33 33
2nd Reﬁnement 192 192
3rd Reﬁnement 115 115
Table 1. Pipeline Proofs
the RTL is represented in the ML programming language and the HOL proof
assistant system [14] used to discharge the proofs.
In [12] and [15] the representation of the processor is raised to the Instruction
Set Architecture (ISA) level and the techniques described focus on the formal
veriﬁcation of the control logic of ﬁrst a 3-stage pipelined ALU and then the
full 5-stage DLX processor. ALU operations are represented as uninterpreted
functions. In order to show that the pipelined processor will behave in the same
way as a notional non-pipelined version, the concept of pipeline ﬂushing is intro-
duced. Stall instructions are introduced at the pipeline input to ensure that each
instruction is completed before the next is initiated. The notion of reﬁnement
maps are introduced in [16] and [17] to extend the ﬂushing concepts of Burch
and Dill to more complex 3 and 10-stage pipelines, using the ACL2 functional
programming language and theorem prover [18].
[19] focuses its attention on the formalization of the pipeline hazards that
can occur when multiple instructions are executed at once in the DLX pipeline.
Structural, data and control hazards are represented and checked using the HOL
veriﬁcation system [14]. Incremental design techniques with reﬁnement are de-
scribed in [20] to show that a notional DLX pipeline that executes one instruction
at a time can be reﬁned to a pipeline that executes 5 instructions at each clock
cycle and manages structural hazards does not encounter a sequence of instruc-
tions that would incur data or control hazards. This pipeline is then further
reﬁned to model the data and control hazards. Abstract State Machines (ASMs)
are used to represent the DLX instructions. In [9], a tool that takes a sequen-
tial model of the DLX pipeline, which is assumed to be correct, and adds the
forwarding logic is described. The tool also provides a proof of correctness for
the generated hardware. Our approach is the only one that starts with an ab-
stract ISA speciﬁcation and proves, systematically, that the concrete, concurrent
pipeline model derived from the ISA implements that speciﬁcation.
5 Conclusions
A method has been explored, using the register/register arithmetic instruction
as an example, to show that the ISA speciﬁcation of the instruction can be re-
ﬁned systematically to a pipelined model that can be proved to implement its
ISA speciﬁcation. The method ensures, through the introduction of gluing in-
variants at each stage, that microarchitectural considerations are addressed early10 J. Colley, M. Butler
in the design ﬂow. Di erent microarchitectures may be explored and veriﬁed at
the speciﬁcation level. Stepwise reﬁnement allows us to manage the multiplicity
of cases caused by pipeline data hazards. The models have been developed us-
ing the Rodin Platform and all the generated proof obligations are discharged
automatically by the tool.
Current work is focused on managing the e ect of branch instructions on
correct pipeline execution. The techniques described have been used to prove
that the pipeline program counter is updated correctly according to the branch
instruction ISA speciﬁcation. Gluing invariants are being developed to ensure
that instructions that have been fetched speculatively are not executed when a
branch is encountered.
A disadvantage of our approach is that we need to specify separate pipeline
stages with a single event. We are exploring a technique that uses reﬁnement and
decomposition to create separate events for each stage once the gluing invariants
have been proved.
In common with Bluespec and CAL, Event-B is based on guarded atomic
actions. The method proposed therefore has the potential to be integrated into
an existing high-level synthesis methodology, providing an automated design and
veriﬁcation ﬂow from high-level speciﬁcation to hardware.
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